Six Months On The War In Ukraine Is A Brutal Stalemate With No End Daniel R Depetris

Take Russia for example. Sensing that Ukrainian forces would either flee or fold within days, Vladimir Putin believed that a military operation in Ukraine could easily get rid of Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government with little resistance. Putin assumed that Russia’s security services, with assets that dug into the Ukrainian political elite, had an accurate, sophisticated read of Ukraine’s internal dynamics and were confident that the Ukrainian people would welcome a pro-Russian government in Kyiv. Russia’s formidable security services, however, vastly underestimated the Ukrainian public’s will to resist and discounted the Ukrainian military as the paper tiger it once fought in 2014, when Ukrainian units were ill-trained, overarmed, understaffed and rife with corruption. The Russian military, which had not fought a large-scale ground war outside Russia itself since the Red Army’s campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s, soon faced the difficulties associated with urban combat. The Ukrainian military made excellent use of Javelin anti-tank missiles provided by Washington and took advantage of Russia’s clumsy execution of combined arms warfare. Within weeks, Russian supply lines were destroyed, tanks and armored personnel carriers sat on the outskirts of Kiev with nowhere to go, and stationary Russian tanks were perfect targets for Ukrainian ambushes. It soon became abundantly clear that Russia did not have the capacity to clear Ukraine’s major cities nor the logistical ability to sustain such an operation. While Russia’s diversion of resources and redeployment to eastern and southern Ukraine has managed to score some territorial gains, advances have been extremely slow and come at a high cost to its personnel and equipment. With the exception of constant Russian artillery barrages on Ukrainian positions, the lines in Donetsk have barely moved since Russian forces captured the twin cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in June and July. Although it is difficult to confirm, there may be as many as 80,000 Russian casualties in the first six months of the war, a number that Putin himself would not have imagined when he launched this so-called “special military operation”. Ukraine also experienced some unexpected setbacks. Emboldened by its initial success in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv, as well as by Russia’s self-abasements on the ground in the early months of the war, the Ukrainian government began operating with an overwhelming sense of optimism that the war could be won militarily. . After their successes, Ukrainian political and military officials began to expect that pushing Russian forces completely out of the country was possible by the end of the year. Ukrainians weren’t the only ones dreaming big. Retired General Ben Hodges, the former commander of US forces in Europe, argued the same thing in early June. These predictions, however, turned out to be overly optimistic. Successful Ukrainian raids against Russian ammunition depots, command and control facilities, logistical support points, and even airfields in Russian-held Kherson and Crimea have had a significant impact on the Russian military’s ability to sustain itself. But the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson that has been telegraphed again and again for months is still in its infancy – and the chances of such a counter-offensive successfully forcing a Russian retreat from the region are not particularly good given Moscow’s continued weapons superiority. Russian artillery fire remains a source of pain for Ukrainian units trying to cut off Russian forces from resupply in Kherson. Zelenskiy’s self-confident boast of the liberation of Crimea aside, such a feat is the definition of delusion. The US and its European allies also had to lower their expectations. In the West, there was a widespread belief that an unprecedented sanctions campaign against Russia would destroy the Russian economy and force Putin to negotiate a salutary end to the war. None of these have happened. While the Russian economy is projected to shrink by 6 percent this year, and more than 1,000 foreign companies have left or scaled back operations in the Russian market, Washington and Brussels have underestimated Moscow’s ability to sustain itself financially. The ruble is stronger today than it was before the war. Russia continues to sell oil and gas at a steady pace, collecting more than $337 billion in oil and gas revenues this year, a 38% increase from 2021. About $10 billion in U.S. military aid to Ukraine has undoubtedly helped Kyiv maintain a costly stalemate against Russian firepower and is complicating the Russian offensive in Donbass. But Putin is no less committed to his military goals today than he was in February. US assumptions about a desperate Russia crying out for a way out of a mess of its own making appear to be a figment of the imagination. If Russia was truly desperate, it would be looking for an exit ramp, not planning to annex occupied Ukrainian territory in a series of planned referendums. Six months after the first Russian missile attacks, it is impossible to imagine how the war will end. But what can be said for sure is that everyone involved is learning once again that there are no guarantees in war.

title: “Six Months On The War In Ukraine Is A Brutal Stalemate With No End Daniel R Depetris Klmat” ShowToc: true date: “2022-11-29” author: “Sharon Wright”

Take Russia for example. Sensing that Ukrainian forces would either flee or fold within days, Vladimir Putin believed that a military operation in Ukraine could easily get rid of Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government with little resistance. Putin assumed that Russia’s security services, with assets that dug into the Ukrainian political elite, had an accurate, sophisticated read of Ukraine’s internal dynamics and were confident that the Ukrainian people would welcome a pro-Russian government in Kyiv. Russia’s formidable security services, however, vastly underestimated the Ukrainian public’s will to resist and discounted the Ukrainian military as the paper tiger it once fought in 2014, when Ukrainian units were ill-trained, overarmed, understaffed and rife with corruption. The Russian military, which had not fought a large-scale ground war outside Russia itself since the Red Army’s campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s, soon faced the difficulties associated with urban combat. The Ukrainian military made excellent use of Javelin anti-tank missiles provided by Washington and took advantage of Russia’s clumsy execution of combined arms warfare. Within weeks, Russian supply lines were destroyed, tanks and armored personnel carriers sat on the outskirts of Kiev with nowhere to go, and stationary Russian tanks were perfect targets for Ukrainian ambushes. It soon became abundantly clear that Russia did not have the capacity to clear Ukraine’s major cities nor the logistical ability to sustain such an operation. While Russia’s diversion of resources and redeployment to eastern and southern Ukraine has managed to score some territorial gains, advances have been extremely slow and come at a high cost to its personnel and equipment. With the exception of constant Russian artillery barrages on Ukrainian positions, the lines in Donetsk have barely moved since Russian forces captured the twin cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in June and July. Although it is difficult to confirm, there may be as many as 80,000 Russian casualties in the first six months of the war, a number that Putin himself would not have imagined when he launched this so-called “special military operation”. Ukraine also experienced some unexpected setbacks. Emboldened by its initial success in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv, as well as by Russia’s self-abasements on the ground in the early months of the war, the Ukrainian government began operating with an overwhelming sense of optimism that the war could be won militarily. . After their successes, Ukrainian political and military officials began to expect that pushing Russian forces completely out of the country was possible by the end of the year. Ukrainians weren’t the only ones dreaming big. Retired General Ben Hodges, the former commander of US forces in Europe, argued the same thing in early June. These predictions, however, turned out to be overly optimistic. Successful Ukrainian raids against Russian ammunition depots, command and control facilities, logistical support points, and even airfields in Russian-held Kherson and Crimea have had a significant impact on the Russian military’s ability to sustain itself. But the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson that has been telegraphed again and again for months is still in its infancy – and the chances of such a counter-offensive successfully forcing a Russian retreat from the region are not particularly good given Moscow’s continued weapons superiority. Russian artillery fire remains a source of pain for Ukrainian units trying to cut off Russian forces from resupply in Kherson. Zelenskiy’s self-confident boast of the liberation of Crimea aside, such a feat is the definition of delusion. The US and its European allies also had to lower their expectations. In the West, there was a widespread belief that an unprecedented sanctions campaign against Russia would destroy the Russian economy and force Putin to negotiate a salutary end to the war. None of these have happened. While the Russian economy is projected to shrink by 6 percent this year, and more than 1,000 foreign companies have left or scaled back operations in the Russian market, Washington and Brussels have underestimated Moscow’s ability to sustain itself financially. The ruble is stronger today than it was before the war. Russia continues to sell oil and gas at a steady pace, collecting more than $337 billion in oil and gas revenues this year, a 38% increase from 2021. About $10 billion in U.S. military aid to Ukraine has undoubtedly helped Kyiv maintain a costly stalemate against Russian firepower and is complicating the Russian offensive in Donbass. But Putin is no less committed to his military goals today than he was in February. US assumptions about a desperate Russia crying out for a way out of a mess of its own making appear to be a figment of the imagination. If Russia was truly desperate, it would be looking for an exit ramp, not planning to annex occupied Ukrainian territory in a series of planned referendums. Six months after the first Russian missile attacks, it is impossible to imagine how the war will end. But what can be said for sure is that everyone involved is learning once again that there are no guarantees in war.

title: “Six Months On The War In Ukraine Is A Brutal Stalemate With No End Daniel R Depetris Klmat” ShowToc: true date: “2022-12-15” author: “Cherry Lopez”

Take Russia for example. Sensing that Ukrainian forces would either flee or fold within days, Vladimir Putin believed that a military operation in Ukraine could easily get rid of Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government with little resistance. Putin assumed that Russia’s security services, with assets that dug into the Ukrainian political elite, had an accurate, sophisticated read of Ukraine’s internal dynamics and were confident that the Ukrainian people would welcome a pro-Russian government in Kyiv. Russia’s formidable security services, however, vastly underestimated the Ukrainian public’s will to resist and discounted the Ukrainian military as the paper tiger it once fought in 2014, when Ukrainian units were ill-trained, overarmed, understaffed and rife with corruption. The Russian military, which had not fought a large-scale ground war outside Russia itself since the Red Army’s campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s, soon faced the difficulties associated with urban combat. The Ukrainian military made excellent use of Javelin anti-tank missiles provided by Washington and took advantage of Russia’s clumsy execution of combined arms warfare. Within weeks, Russian supply lines were destroyed, tanks and armored personnel carriers sat on the outskirts of Kiev with nowhere to go, and stationary Russian tanks were perfect targets for Ukrainian ambushes. It soon became abundantly clear that Russia did not have the capacity to clear Ukraine’s major cities nor the logistical ability to sustain such an operation. While Russia’s diversion of resources and redeployment to eastern and southern Ukraine has managed to score some territorial gains, advances have been extremely slow and come at a high cost to its personnel and equipment. With the exception of constant Russian artillery barrages on Ukrainian positions, the lines in Donetsk have barely moved since Russian forces captured the twin cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in June and July. Although it is difficult to confirm, there may be as many as 80,000 Russian casualties in the first six months of the war, a number that Putin himself would not have imagined when he launched this so-called “special military operation”. Ukraine also experienced some unexpected setbacks. Emboldened by its initial success in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv, as well as by Russia’s self-abasements on the ground in the early months of the war, the Ukrainian government began operating with an overwhelming sense of optimism that the war could be won militarily. . After their successes, Ukrainian political and military officials began to expect that pushing Russian forces completely out of the country was possible by the end of the year. Ukrainians weren’t the only ones dreaming big. Retired General Ben Hodges, the former commander of US forces in Europe, argued the same thing in early June. These predictions, however, turned out to be overly optimistic. Successful Ukrainian raids against Russian ammunition depots, command and control facilities, logistical support points, and even airfields in Russian-held Kherson and Crimea have had a significant impact on the Russian military’s ability to sustain itself. But the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson that has been telegraphed again and again for months is still in its infancy – and the chances of such a counter-offensive successfully forcing a Russian retreat from the region are not particularly good given Moscow’s continued weapons superiority. Russian artillery fire remains a source of pain for Ukrainian units trying to cut off Russian forces from resupply in Kherson. Zelenskiy’s self-confident boast of the liberation of Crimea aside, such a feat is the definition of delusion. The US and its European allies also had to lower their expectations. In the West, there was a widespread belief that an unprecedented sanctions campaign against Russia would destroy the Russian economy and force Putin to negotiate a salutary end to the war. None of these have happened. While the Russian economy is projected to shrink by 6 percent this year, and more than 1,000 foreign companies have left or scaled back operations in the Russian market, Washington and Brussels have underestimated Moscow’s ability to sustain itself financially. The ruble is stronger today than it was before the war. Russia continues to sell oil and gas at a steady pace, collecting more than $337 billion in oil and gas revenues this year, a 38% increase from 2021. About $10 billion in U.S. military aid to Ukraine has undoubtedly helped Kyiv maintain a costly stalemate against Russian firepower and is complicating the Russian offensive in Donbass. But Putin is no less committed to his military goals today than he was in February. US assumptions about a desperate Russia crying out for a way out of a mess of its own making appear to be a figment of the imagination. If Russia was truly desperate, it would be looking for an exit ramp, not planning to annex occupied Ukrainian territory in a series of planned referendums. Six months after the first Russian missile attacks, it is impossible to imagine how the war will end. But what can be said for sure is that everyone involved is learning once again that there are no guarantees in war.

title: “Six Months On The War In Ukraine Is A Brutal Stalemate With No End Daniel R Depetris Klmat” ShowToc: true date: “2022-12-14” author: “Jose Laferriere”

Take Russia for example. Sensing that Ukrainian forces would either flee or fold within days, Vladimir Putin believed that a military operation in Ukraine could easily get rid of Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s government with little resistance. Putin assumed that Russia’s security services, with assets that dug into the Ukrainian political elite, had an accurate, sophisticated read of Ukraine’s internal dynamics and were confident that the Ukrainian people would welcome a pro-Russian government in Kyiv. Russia’s formidable security services, however, vastly underestimated the Ukrainian public’s will to resist and discounted the Ukrainian military as the paper tiger it once fought in 2014, when Ukrainian units were ill-trained, overarmed, understaffed and rife with corruption. The Russian military, which had not fought a large-scale ground war outside Russia itself since the Red Army’s campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s, soon faced the difficulties associated with urban combat. The Ukrainian military made excellent use of Javelin anti-tank missiles provided by Washington and took advantage of Russia’s clumsy execution of combined arms warfare. Within weeks, Russian supply lines were destroyed, tanks and armored personnel carriers sat on the outskirts of Kiev with nowhere to go, and stationary Russian tanks were perfect targets for Ukrainian ambushes. It soon became abundantly clear that Russia did not have the capacity to clear Ukraine’s major cities nor the logistical ability to sustain such an operation. While Russia’s diversion of resources and redeployment to eastern and southern Ukraine has managed to score some territorial gains, advances have been extremely slow and come at a high cost to its personnel and equipment. With the exception of constant Russian artillery barrages on Ukrainian positions, the lines in Donetsk have barely moved since Russian forces captured the twin cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in June and July. Although it is difficult to confirm, there may be as many as 80,000 Russian casualties in the first six months of the war, a number that Putin himself would not have imagined when he launched this so-called “special military operation”. Ukraine also experienced some unexpected setbacks. Emboldened by its initial success in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv, as well as by Russia’s self-abasements on the ground in the early months of the war, the Ukrainian government began operating with an overwhelming sense of optimism that the war could be won militarily. . After their successes, Ukrainian political and military officials began to expect that pushing Russian forces completely out of the country was possible by the end of the year. Ukrainians weren’t the only ones dreaming big. Retired General Ben Hodges, the former commander of US forces in Europe, argued the same thing in early June. These predictions, however, turned out to be overly optimistic. Successful Ukrainian raids against Russian ammunition depots, command and control facilities, logistical support points, and even airfields in Russian-held Kherson and Crimea have had a significant impact on the Russian military’s ability to sustain itself. But the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson that has been telegraphed again and again for months is still in its infancy – and the chances of such a counter-offensive successfully forcing a Russian retreat from the region are not particularly good given Moscow’s continued weapons superiority. Russian artillery fire remains a source of pain for Ukrainian units trying to cut off Russian forces from resupply in Kherson. Zelenskiy’s self-confident boast of the liberation of Crimea aside, such a feat is the definition of delusion. The US and its European allies also had to lower their expectations. In the West, there was a widespread belief that an unprecedented sanctions campaign against Russia would destroy the Russian economy and force Putin to negotiate a salutary end to the war. None of these have happened. While the Russian economy is projected to shrink by 6 percent this year, and more than 1,000 foreign companies have left or scaled back operations in the Russian market, Washington and Brussels have underestimated Moscow’s ability to sustain itself financially. The ruble is stronger today than it was before the war. Russia continues to sell oil and gas at a steady pace, collecting more than $337 billion in oil and gas revenues this year, a 38% increase from 2021. About $10 billion in U.S. military aid to Ukraine has undoubtedly helped Kyiv maintain a costly stalemate against Russian firepower and is complicating the Russian offensive in Donbass. But Putin is no less committed to his military goals today than he was in February. US assumptions about a desperate Russia crying out for a way out of a mess of its own making appear to be a figment of the imagination. If Russia was truly desperate, it would be looking for an exit ramp, not planning to annex occupied Ukrainian territory in a series of planned referendums. Six months after the first Russian missile attacks, it is impossible to imagine how the war will end. But what can be said for sure is that everyone involved is learning once again that there are no guarantees in war.